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A CONTROVERSIAL SETTLEMENT APPROACH:
THE ALPERT LETTER
CINDY J. JACKSON
I. THE ALPERT LETTER
A HEATED CONTROVERSY' among lawyers and insur-
ance underwriters specializing in aircrash litigation cen-
ters around an approach to claims settlement that was
introduced by United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.
(USAU) in 1977.2 Shortly after an aircrash, insurance under-
writers following the "Tenerife Approach" or "Alpert Ap-
proach", as the practice is sometimes called, send letters to
potential claimants offering early settlement and discourag-
ing them from hiring lawyers to pursue their claims on a con-
tingent fee arrangement.' USAU has used the Tenerife
Approach and Alpert Letter in every major aircrash involv-
ing its insureds since 1977.' The debate over the propriety of
this practice has been renewed recently as a result of USAU's
use of the Tenerife Approach to handle claims resulting from
the crash of a Pan American 727 aircraft after takeoff from
New Orleans International Airport on July 9, 1982.'
According to Robert L. Alpert, Jr., the senior vice presi-
dent of USAU and the author of the Alpert Letter, the Ten-
, The Alpert Letter has been a controversial topic among those in the aviation in-
dustry since it was first used in 1977. Wermeil,Pan Am's Insurer Stirs Controversy By Urging
Families to Avoid Suing, Wall St. J., July 14, 1982, at 31, col. 4.
2 Craft, Factors In/ktencing Settlement of Personal Injury and Death Claims in Aircraft Accident
Litigation, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 895 (1981).
Kreindler, The Letter Should Not Be Sent, THE BRIEF 5 (Nov. 1982).
Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983).
Wermeil, supra note 1.
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erife Approach was formulated in an effort to reverse the
then-prevalent situation in which less than fifty percent of the
money paid out by the insurer after an aircrash was received
by victims or their families.6 The remaining money was con-
sumed by court fees, defense attorneys' fees, and plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees.7 According to Alpert, USAU determined that
its clients, the airlines, gained nothing when litigation with
an aircrash victim or his family was extended over a long pe-
riod of time.8 Since compensation virtually was guaranteed
the victims or their families,9 Alpert says, USAU determined
that it should attempt to settle with claimants as soon as pos-
6 Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983).
7Id
a Id Alpert noted that defendants in aircrash litigation may harm their position
severely with respect to claimants by denying liability for the accident and "creating a
fiction of contingency" of recovery for the plaintiff. Although USAU did not handle
the claims arising out of the crash of a Turkish Airlines DC-10 in Paris, France in 1974,
Alpert conceded that the litigation arising out of that crash demonstrated the harm
that could befall defendants by treating plaintiffs' claims as if recovery were contin-
gent. Id The claims arising out of the Turkish Airlines crash were escalated because
the defendants, each blaming the other for the accident, resisted settlement with claim-
ants. The result was that many of the claimants hired plaintiffs' lawyers on contin-
gency fees and "what may have been a twenty million dollar accident grew full flower
into . . . . a one hundred million dollar accident." Address by Lee S. Kreindler,
plaintiff's attorney, American Bar Ass'n, Annual Meeting (Aug. 10, 1981, New Orle-
ans) (debating the propriety of the Alpert Letter with defense attorney, Randal R.
Craft, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Address by Lee S. Kreindler]. Kreindler speculated that
the Tenerife Approach originated as a result of the Turkish Airlines crash. Kreindler
said:
[Tlhe London insurance market and the American companies learned a
bitter lesson. And I think they decided that they'd better keep their own
houses in order and not fight each other, and work together, and stop
denying liability in these major airline tragedies and rush out and get
rid of the cases before they graduated into big cases . ...
Id.
Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983). Alpert observed that compensation after an
aircrash is guaranteed the victims or their families. The only remaining question, Al-
pert said, was from whom they would be compensated. As a matter of policy, the
insurer determined that it would be in the best interest of the airlines, USAU's clients,
to offer to compensate the victims soon after an accident because their compensation
did not depend upon which defendant or defendants ultimately were found liable for
the accident. The airline's readiness to pay damages to victims or their families as soon
as possible after an accident, Alpert said, stemmed from the airline's responsibility to
its passengers because they paid the airline for the flight. Id.
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sible, thereby lessening the accumulation of large legal bills."
The, party defendants could later litigate among themselves
the issue of ultimate liability."I
USAU put these concepts to the test for the first time fol-
lowing the collision of a KLM 747 and a Pan American 747
on a runway at Tenerife in the Canary Islands on March 27,
1977.12 Under the Tenerife Approach, the airline's insurer
organizes a claims team that is ready to fly to the scene of an
accident.' 3 There the team assists the airline and the victims
or their survivors.14The team helps the survivors identify bod-
ies, make funeral arrangements, and secure hotel accommo-
dations. 15 It also offers to advance funds to them to meet
immediate economic needs.
16
The claims team also begins gathering information on
which to base settlement offers. 17 It obtains basic personal in-
formation about the victims by making personal contact
with their survivors.' 8 The team then tries to determine
what laws will be applicable to the potential claims and how
claimants' damages will be measured under those laws.' 9 It
o d
Id. Alpert emphasized his position that the insurer's offer to settle with victims or
their families did not constitute an admission of liability for the accident on behalf of
the airline. According to Alpert, the airline retained the right to sue other defendants
in actions for contribution or indemnity. Id.
12 Id.
I, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9. See generally, Craft, supra note 2, at 896-900 (describ-
ing the benefits of the Tenerife Approach from the perspective of a defense attorney
hired by an airline's underwriter).
' Craft, supra note 2, at 898.
' Kreindler,supra note 3, at 9. While Craft says that the insurer's assistance is given
in response to inquiries it receives from passengers and next of kin, it has been observed
that USAU was not particularly concerned about the financial or personal problems
of aircrash victims or their survivors before it adopted the Tenerife Approach to claims
settlement. See generaly, Address by Lee S. Kreindler, supra note 8 (in which Kreindler
criticizes the Tenerife Approach as a self-serving attempt by USAU to reduce its
claims costs).
, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9.
" Craft, supra note 2, at 898.
'Id
,9 Id In researching the law applicable to actions arising out of an aircrash, it is
likely that an insurer will consider conflict of laws questions, whether the injured
party's domicile provides for prejudgment interest, whether punitive damages are re-
coverable, and whether any international conventions are applicable to the accident.
See Craft, supra note 2, at 898; Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, The Brief 5 (Nov. 1982)
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also attempts to determine whether international conventions
apply to the accident or to potential claims.2 °
Within a few days after the crash,2 the underwriter sends a
letter to potential claimants.2 2 In the "Alpert Letter", Rob-
ert L. Alpert, Jr.,23 of USAU begins by expressing his condo-
lences.2' He then discusses the identification process and
provides the telephone numbers of claims personnel for the
family to contact if they have questions. Alpert offers to pay
all costs of funeral arrangements and to advance funds to the
families.25 He also informs the potential claimants that
claims personnel will be contacting them within two weeks
to obtain information so that they may evaluate claims and
[hereinafter cited as Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent]. See generaly , In re Air Crash Disas-
ter Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 633, 637-41 ( 7th Cir. 1981) (holding that under Illinois
law, prejudgment interest is not a separate element of damages in a wrongful death
case); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981) (discuss-
ing various state statutes regarding the allowance of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions); Dubuc and Doctor, Legislative Developments Afecting the Aviation Industty
1981-82, 48 J. Air L. & Com. 263, 268-275 (1983) (discussing problems air carriers face
with respect to the Warsaw Convention limitations on liability); Note, Con/ict of Laws,
47 J. Air Law & Com. 339 (1982) (discussing conflict of laws issues arising out of air-
crash cases).
-o Craft, supra note 2, at 898. The Warsaw Convention limits recovery in wrongful
death actions in international flights to $75,000 per passenger, which may be extended
only by proof of wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the airlines. See generally,
Haskell, The Warsaw System And The US Constituion Revit~ed, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 483
(1973).
2, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9. In the New Orleans crash, the letter was mailed four
days after the aircrash. Id
22 In his article, The Letter Should Be Sent, Randal R. Craft, Jr. says that the letter is
mailed because of a pre-existing relationship between the airline and its passengers.
Craft writes:
The letter describing the settlement approach is unquestionably based
on the airline's duties and obligations to passengers and other injured
parties. The accident cemented an already existing relationship between
the airline and any injured parties on the ground. This should be distin-
guished from a situation in which a plaintiff attorney with no previous
relationship with a claimant contacts him after an accident and tries to
create . . a new relationship from which the attorney will profit.
Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 6.
23 Alpert, the senior vice president and director of claims of USAU, is also an attor-
ney. The letters are written on USAU's letterhead and are signed by Alpert in his
position as senior vice president and director of claims. Id at 8, n.3.
21 Letter from Robert L. Alpert, Jr. of USAU to potential claimants in the July 9,
1982, Pan American 727 crash in Kenner, Louisiana (July 14, 1982), reprinted in The




While there are undoubtedly some who would criticize the
letter if it contained no more than the remarks described
above, these portions of the letter have received little atten-
tion in the debate over the letter's propriety. The last four
paragraphs of the letter, on the other hand, have sparked a
great deal of controversy in the legal and insurance fields.27
The letter states:
Money damages can never compensate for the loss of a loved
one but this is the medium recognized by the law for compen-
sating victims and the families of victims in air disasters ....
It is our intention to see that you receive fair compensation
for the loss which you have sustained. It is also our hope that
you will retain as much of the compensation as is properly
due you without unnecessary diversion of large amounts to
legal expenses.28
Alpert then discourages claimants from hiring lawyers to rep-
resent them on a contingency fee arrangement. Alpert writes:
You may find yourselves under pressure to sign a contingent
fee retainer with an attorney whereby his fee is a percentage
of the final award. The rationale for such a percentage fee is
that the lawyer risks getting no fee if there is no recovery.
There is no such contingency in this case. There is also noth-
ing to be gained by a precipitous lawsuit. We do suggest that
it would be in your best interest to evaluate the offers which
will be made to you and obtain the help of your attorney
based upon a fee for the work involved rather than a percent-
age of the settlement award.29
Alpert also attempts to dissuade claimants from filing suit im-
mediately. The letter continues:
Immediate legal action is unnecessary to avoid permitting ap-
plicable time periods (i.e., statutes of limitations, etc.) to ex-
27 The letter has been the subject of at least two public debates, was discussed at
length on the public television show, "Nightline", and has been discussed in numerous
articles. See generally, The Letter. ShouldIt Be Sent? THE BRIEF 5 (Nov. 1982) (discussing
the pros and cons of the Alpert Letter and the Tenerife Approach).
Alpert Letter, supra note 24.
SId
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pire. Should discussions not ultimately result in an amicable
resolution of any claims that might exist, we provide a reason-
able extension of any applicable time limitation based upon
the facts and circumstances of the individual case in order
that you will have ample time to take any path you choose as
to counsel you retain, the basis upon which he is paid or
whether you wish to institute a lawsuit. Please do not be
rushed into limiting your alternatives or committing your-
selves needlessly to an inordinate legal expense.3 °
A few weeks after the letter is sent, USAU mails a second
letter to potential claimants. 3' This letter includes a copy of
an article written by United States District Judge John F.
Grady.3 2 In the article, Judge Grady criticizes the contin-
gency fee system and argues that contingency fees often bear
no relation to the value of services performed.3 Judge Grady
asserts that contingency fees are unconscionable when awards
are high because there often is no real contingency in per-
sonal injury cases. 4
Once a claimant retains counsel, USAU and their defense
counsel direct all further communication to the claimant's at-
torney 35 and obtain from the attorney the information neces-
sary to formulate a settlement offer.36 When it has evaluated
'oId
" Kreindler, supra note 3, at 11.
32 Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LITIGATION J. 20 (Summer
1976). Grady is a federal district judge for the Northern District of Illinois.
- Id at 23.
3, Id at 24.
" Craft, supra note 2, at 901. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that during the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in
that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing
such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (A)(1)(1979).
- Craft, supra note 2 at 901. Six days after the 1979 crash of an American Airlines
DC-10 at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, Mr. Alpert wrote to two lawyers
representing the family of one of the victims. Alpert wrote:
In our opinion the precipitous commencement of this lawsuit is unfortu-
nate. Frequently such lawsuits are filed only to highlight the identity in
the media of the attorneys of record for the plaintiff and do not take into
consideration the orderly and reasonable presentation of damage infor-
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the damages information,37 USAU makes a settlement offer.38
Though the offer purports to be final,39 USAU often makes
higher settlement offers when it is faced with the prospect of
trial.4 °
II. THE CONTROVERSY
The debate over the Tenerife approach began six years ago
when it was introduced by USAU after the crash at Tener-
ife.4 Personal injury plaintiffs' attorneys generally complain
that the letter is a self-serving attempt by underwriters to re-
mation to the potentially responsible parties in anticipation of an amica-
ble settlement. Such a settlement can be accomplished without an
unnecessary diversion of large amounts to contingent legal fees and liti-
gation expenses.
Letter from Robert L. Alpert, Jr. of USAU to lawyers representing claimants in the
1979 American Airlines DC-10 crash in Chicago (May 31, 1979), reprinted in Kreindler,
supra note 3, at 38.
.7 Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 5. Craft says that the initial settlement offers
are based on assessments of the amount the claimant would likely be awarded at the
trial of damage issues alone, applying the law of the injured party's domicile. Id Craft,
supra note 2, at 899. According to Craft, the offers are not discounted because they are
extended soon after the accident, nor are they affected by the fact that the injured
party is represented by an attorney working for a contingent fee. Craft, The Letter Should
Be Sent, supra note 19, at 5.
-" Craft, supra note 2, at 899. Lee Kreindler contends that the underwriter deter-
mines the amount of the initial settlement by assuming a "real value" of the case by
subtracting a substantial amount for the plaintiff's attorneys fees, an additional
amount for defense costs, and another small amount. The result is that the amount of
the offer is approximately sixty five percent of the "real value" of the case. Address by
Lee S. Kreindler, supra note 8.
1, Id. In an attempt to settle claims arising out of the DC-10 crash at Chicago's
O'Hare International Airport on May 25, 1979, Alpert wrote to plaintiffs' attorneys
informing them that the underwriter's offer was final. Alpert wrote:
[W]e do not intend to make an increase in [the] offer now or in the fu-
ture. The case will simply have to be tried to determine whose evalua-
tion was more accurate . . . .Recovery will be sought against you and
your client(s) for any and all cost, incurred in responding to this unnec-
essary liability 'fishing expedition'. ...
Letter from Robert L. Alpert, Jr. of USAU to lawyers representing claimants in the
1979 American Airlines DC-10 crash in Chicago (May 31, 1979), reprintedt) Kreindler,
supra note 3, at 38.
- Id at 11. Kreindler claims that in one case he handled in connection with the
DC-10 crash in Chicago in 1979, the underwriter's initial offer was $800,000. The
underwriter paid $1,750,000 as trial was about to begin. Kreindler does not mention
how much of the final award was paid to the plaintiff's attorney as a contingency fee.
rd
" Wermeil, supra note 1.
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duce their claims costs by paying claimants less and reducing
the legal fees of both plaintiff and defense attorneys. 42 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys say that the letter exploits families at a time
when they are vulnerable and induces them to settle with the
airline for less money than they might obtain otherwise. 43 It
has also been argued that although underwriters using the
Tenerife Approach purport to strive for an early settlement,"
their actual intent is to delay settlement in order to earn in-
terest on their money for as long as possible. 5 Under this
theory, USAU places itself in a no-lose situation in which it
makes extremely low initial settlement offers as a sham, ex-
pecting that the offers will not be accepted.4 6 If the offer is
not accepted, USAU retains the offered sum, earning interest
on it until the claim is resolved. If the low initial offer is ac-
cepted, on the other hand, USAU is benefitted by obtaining
an extremely advantageous settlement of the claim.47
Underwriters and defense attorneys, on the other hand, say
that the letter leads to reasonable settlement, provides for
early disbursement of money to claimants, and avoids exces-
sive legal fees.48 They contend that under the Tenerife Ap-
proach, claimants need not wait for reasonable
compensation, and compensation need not be diminished
significantly by contingent fees.49 In addition, defense attor-
neys argue that the Tenerife Approach is designed in such a
way that, even if claimants later might receive higher awards
42 Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9. Kreindler says that the Alpert Approach is "anti-
lawyer and tends to drive a wedge between claimants and the experienced lawyer
S. .  Moreover, in its aggressive approach to grief-stricken families within hours or
days of utter human tragedy, it is heartless and inhumane. It gives both lawyers and
insurers a bad name." Id. at 38.
43 Wermeil, supra note 1.
Craft, supra note 2, at 897. Wermeil, supra note 1.
Kreindler, Settlement, N.Y.L.J., April 17, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Kreindler calls the Ten-
erife Approach a "no settlement approach" reasoning that in major aircrash litigation,
where passenger claims may amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, the underwriter
has a large incentive to hold onto its money as long as possible. Kreindler notes that
even though some jurisdictions allow prejudgment interest to run on a damages award
from the date suit is filed, that interest rate is far lower than the market rate. Id.
-' Id
:7 (d.
' Craft, supra note 2, at 897.
Id.
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or offers, they will probably net more by settling early.5 °
Some plaintiffs' and defense attorneys concede that the
Tenerife Approach has produced both positive and negative
results.51 In his article, The Letter Should Be Sent,52 Randal R.
Craft, Jr. concedes that some people may be offended by the
Alpert Letter.53 Lee Kreindler, a plaintiffs' attorney who vig-
orously opposes the letter, concedes that the letter has benefit-
ted the public because contingency fees in major airline cases
have dropped to an average of 17.5 percent compared to the
33.33 percent that prevails in most negligence cases.54 Krein-
dler further concedes that the letter has led to the develop-
ment of a variety of fee arrangements between plaintiffs and
their attorneys. 55 For example, in some cases plaintiffs' attor-
neys fees now are based on the difference between the
amount the plaintiff was offered by the insurer before the
plaintiff retained counsel and the amount the plaintiff ulti-
mately received. 56 The Tenerife Approach also has reduced
See generally, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing the positive and negative
effects of the letter); Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 6 (in which Craft,
a defense attorney, concedes that the letter may be offensive to some people).
12 Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19.
53 Id at 6.
54 Kreindler, supra note 3, at 38.
Id Kreindler writes:
[I]n some cases the plaintiff attorney's fee is based on the excess over
what the defendant offers. In a situation where the claimant has been
offered $800,000 he may be reluctant to retain a lawyer for litigation
without something close to a guarantee that he will at least net $800,000.
This has led to a variety of fee arrangements.
Id
"' Lee Kreindler concedes that the Alpert Approach has resulted in a variety of fee
structures and'refers to the three payment options available to his clients as an exam-
ple. First, the client may pay a contingency fee calculated as a percentage of the
amount ultimately received by the plaintiff at trial or by settlement. These fees are
calculated on a sliding scale so that the percent charged declines as the firm is retained
by additional clients from the same accident. For example, if the firm is representing
only one client, he is charged a 25% contingency fee. If it represents two clients, they
are each charged 24%. If the firm is retained by nine clients or more, each is charged
17.5%, which is the firm's lowest rate. Under the second option, the firm charges a
client five percent of the defendant's offer as a fee for evaluating the value of the cli-
ent's case. Thus, if the defendant offered $500,000 and the firm's evaluation deter-
mined that the client's claim was worth no more than $500,000, the firm would charge
the client $25,000 for the evaluation, and, presumably, would advise the client to ac-
cept the settlement offer. Using the same example, the third option would arise when
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fees paid to defense lawyers by shifting responsibility for
much of the negotiations and settlement work from ,defense
attorneys to insurance claims personnel."
7
Because of the large sums of money involved in air crash
litigation, plaintiffs' and defense attorneys as well as insur-
ance underwriters have a financial stake in the debate over
the Alpert Letter. 58 For this reason the debate over the letter
is a heated one and is likely to continue.59 USAU has not
indicated that it intends to alter or abandon the approach.
In fact, Robert L. Alpert, Jr. has stated that USAU plans to
continue developing the Tenerife Approach. 6°
Those opposing the Tenerife Approach have urged the bar,
the courts, and state legislatures to prohibit the letter's use.6 1
To date, however, these bodies have not censured the letter or
directed that it not be sent.62  Interestingly, the California
the firm determined that the case was worth more than $500,000. In that event, Krein-
dler would charge the client five percent of the original offer ($25,000) plus twenty-five
percent of the excess over the original offer ultimately obtained with the help of coun-
sel. According to Kreindler most of his clients choose the first option. Address by Lee
S. Kreindler, supra note 8.
.7 Kreindler, supra note 3, at 38.
Kreindler, Chicago Post-Mortem--Shameful Behavior, N.Y.L.J. June 15, 1979, at 1,
col. 1.
!,9 Wermeilsupra note 1.
- Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983). Alpert indicated that USAU intends to use in
some future crashes a modified version of the letter sent out following the 1982 Pan
American Airlines crash in Kenner, Louisiana. Alpert also suggested that USAU's
development of the Tenerife Approach was not limited to modification of the letter. Id
6, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9.
.2 Craft, supra note 2, at 899. In litigation arising out of the 1979 American Airlines
DC-10 crash in Chicago, Ill., the Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation denied a
plaintiff's motion to issue notice of the pendency of proceedings before the Panel to the
families of all victims regardless of whether or not they had brought suit. The Panel
noted without comment plaintiff's contention that the proposed notice was crucial be-
cause USAU had communicated directly with the families of victims in an attempt to
dissuade them from initiating litigation. The Panel held that regardless of the merits
of giving such notice to non-litigants, the Panei lacked the power to require it. In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, II1., 476 F. Supp. 445, 450 n.7 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
The propriety of the Alpert Letter also was put in issue in litigation arising out of the
1982 Pan American 727 crash in Kenner, Louisiana. There, Judge Duplantier of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered a contempt
judgment against Robert L. Alpert, Jr. for allegedly violating a court order prohibiting
USAU from contacting claimants represented by counsel. Judge Duplantier later set
aside the contempt order. According to Alpert, an independent adjusting company in
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Bar Association cleared the original Alpert Letter before it
was mailed following the Tenerife disaster.63
III. THE CODE PROVISIONS
Some critics of the Alpert Letter contend that its use is un-
ethical.'M This criticism is based upon a disciplinary rule of
the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional
Responsibility 65 that provides that during the course of repre-
sentation of a client, a lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a
person who is not represented by a lawyer other than the ad-
vice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or
have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the in-
terests of his client. '66  The ABA's newly adopted67 "Model
New Orleans rather than USAU sent the letter made the basis of the contempt order.
Alpert said Judge Duplantier vacated the contempt order because of a 1976 Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals case, Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976), which
held that a federal court judge could not enjoin a party defendant from directly con-
tacting victims or heirs for the purpose of settling the case, even if the victims or heirs
were represented by counsel. Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior
Vice President and Director of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983). In Lewis, the court
reasoned that since any settlement gained by overbearing conduct, duress, coercion,
fraud or overreaching could be set aside, the equitable remedy of injunction was not
justified. 534 F.2d at 1123. It is important to note, however, that Lewis was an admi-
ralty case involving injuries to seamen. The court observed that since a seaman is a
ward of the admiralty, a settlement agreement executed by a seaman would be subject
to careful scrutiny by the courts. Id See also, Cook v. Moran Atlantic Towing Corp., 76
F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a claimant has the right to discharge his
attorneys prior to settlement of the case).
63 THE FUTURE OF AVIATION TORT LAW (1978) (transcript of Proceedings of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America), Monaco (Feb. 8, 1978)).
- Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9-11; Wermeil, supra note 1. In Bode v. U. S. Aviation
Underwriters, Inc., No. 82-3121 H (E.D. La. filed July 29, 1982) two families whose
homes were destroyed by the Pan American Airlines crash in Kenner, Louisiana in
July, 1982, filed suit against U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. asserting claims for dam-
ages resulting from use of the Alpert Letter. The petition alleged that use of the letter
constituted an invasion of privacy and an interference with the attorney-client rela-
tionship. In particular, the petition alleged that by sending the letter, Alpert rendered
unethical legal advice. Id
- The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of
the ABA on August 12, 1969. COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 1 (1975).
'1 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1979). Prior
to the ABA's adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, the
Canons of Professional Ethics were in effect. Communications between an attorney
and an unrepresented adverse party were governed by Canon 9 which provided in
part: "It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may
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Rules of Professional Conduct '68  contain substantially
equivalent language in the comment69 to Rule 4.3.70 The
comment provides, "[d]uring the course of a lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client, the lawyer should not give advice to an
unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain
counsel."'"
What constitutes improper "advice" within the meaning of
these provisions is unclear.7 2 It is clear, however, that the dis-
ciplinary rule is not intended as an absolute ban on all direct
communication between an attorney and an unrepresented
adverse party.7 3 Ethics committee opinions interpreting the
rule indicate that there are two recognizable limitations on
an attorney's communication with an unrepresented adverse
party. The attorney must avoid everything that may tend to
tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to
advise him as to the law." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 9 (1908), re-
printed !n AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 43
(1967).
' The members of the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct at
their annual meeting in August, 1983, in Atlanta, Georgia.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted tn 52 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 16,
1983).
- The preamble to the new Model Rules provides that the comments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidelines for practicing in compliance with the
Rules. The preamble also states that use of the term "should" in a rule indicates that
the rule is permissive and that the lawyer has professional discretion. The preamble
further states that no disciplinary action should be taken when a lawyer chooses not to
act or acts within the bounds of his or her discretion. MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble, reprinted 'n 52 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 16, 1983).
70 Id. Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepre-
sented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Id., Rule 4.3.
1' Id., comment to Rule 4.3.
12 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 340 (1979).
11 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 908 (1966) (an attorney
may interview a potentially adverse party and take his statement); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 670 (1963) (an attorney may inquire
about the policy limits of a prospective defendant's liability insurance); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 102 (1933) (an attorney representing an employer
may draft settlement papers for workmen's compensation claims when the employee is
not represented by counsel).
COMMENTS
mislead an adverse party unrepresented by counsel, 74 and
should not undertake to advise him "as to the law." 75
In Informal Opinion 908,76 the ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances concluded ,that it was not un-
ethical for an attorney representing a potential plaintiff to
interview a potential defendant and take his statement.77
The committee warned, however, that the attorney should
advise the potential defendant that he was conducting an in-
terview and was attempting to take the statement in his posi-
tion as counsel for the potential plaintiff.78 The committee
based its conclusion on an earlier ABA opinion 79 that stated
that it was not improper for a plaintiffs attorney who had
not yet filed suit to inquire about the policy limits of a pro-
spective defendant's liability insurance, as long as the lawyer
did nothing that would tend to mislead the prospective
defendant .80
In ABA Formal Opinion 102,1 the ABA ethics committee
concluded that it was not improper for an attorney represent-
ing an employer to draft settlement papers for workman's
compensation settlements when the employee was not repre-
sented by counsel.2 The committee reasoned that many
state statutes provided that compensation for an employee's
injury be made in a lump settlement on the joint petition of
the employer and employee and approved by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. 3 The committee concluded that when an
,4 M. PIRSIG, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 285 (1970); ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Informal Op. 670 (1963). See also, Lyons v. Paul, 321 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.
Civ. App. - Waco 1959, writ refd n.r.e). (holding that a lawyer who files suit and is
contacted in any manner by one of the parties who has been sued, owes a duty to the
party to advise him immediately that he is on the other side of the litigation and
cannot render any service whatsoever to the opposing party making inquiry of him).
" M. PIRSIG, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 285 (1970); ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Formal Op. 102 (1933).
76 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 908 (1966).
7'Id
78 Id.
, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 680 (1963).
~7Id
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employee was not represented by counsel, the employer's at-
torney properly could prepare the settlement papers as long
as the attorney refrained from advising the employee about
the law and avoided misleading the employee about the law
or facts.8 4 Additionally, the attorney was required to advise
the court that he prepared the settlement papers and that the
employee was not represented by counsel.8 5
The parameters of the Code's prohibition against "mis-
leading" an adverse party unrepresented by counsel or giving
him "advice as to the law" are difficult to discern. "Mislead-
ing" is a broad term and appears to include any situation in
which an attorney, by representation or omission, induces or
tends to induce an unrepresented adverse party to take a po-
sition that is adverse to the party's interests.8 6 For example,
in Informal Opinion 734,87 the ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances said that it was improper for an
attorney to send collection letters that described in legal
terms collections suits that may have been filed and
threatened to bring additional proceedings when such suits
and proceedings had no direct connection with the action to
collect the debts.88 The committee decided that the collec-
tion letters were meant to coerce and frighten the alleged
debtor and were improper.8 9 Similarly, in Formal Opinion
178, ° the ABA committee decided that it was improper for a
creditor's attorney to send papers to debtors which, unless
carefully read, created the false impression that suit had been
instituted against the debtor, when, in fact, the papers consti-
tuted a demand for payment.9 The Committee found the
RI Id.
I, d.
See generally, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 734 (1964) (decid-
ing that an attorney representing a client in an action to collect a debt could not
threaten additonal suits that were not connected directly to the action in an effort to
coerce or frighten the party into paying the debt); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 178 (1938) (deciding that a creditor's attorney could not send papers to
debtors that created the false impression that suit had been filed).
87 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 734 (1964).
m. Id
-" Id
- ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 178 (1938).
' IId.
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papers "palpably misleading" and improper. 92
An approximate definition of the term "advice as to the
law" can be formulated by analyzing various ethics commit-
tee opinions that discuss improper advice.93 These opinions
indicate that the term "advice as to the law" encompasses
any statement regarding a party's legal rights or the legal
consequences of his acts or omissions. 94 The New York Bar
Association ethics committee, for example, decided that it
was improper for an attorney representing a personal injury
plaintiff to send a copy of a letter to an unrepresented poten-
tial defendant advising him that failure to settle within the
defendant's insurance policy limits would be considered bad
faith and would expose the defendant to judgment in excess
of his policy limits.95 The ethics committee reasoned that
such a letter rendered legal advice to the potential defendant
in violation of DR7-104(A)(2). 96 In a similar opinion,97 the
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances de-
cided that a lawyer may not write to a debtor unrepresented
by counsel to tell him that a judgment against him will injure
his credit or reflect on his moral standing.98
W Id.
- N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 358 (1974), reprinted in
46 N.Y. St. B.J. 625 (1974); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1034
(1968); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 58 (1931).
- See generaly N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 358 (1974),
reprtnted in 46 N.Y. St. B.J. 625 (1974)(deciding that it was improper for a plaintiff's
attorney to advise an unrepresented defendant that failure to settle within the defend-
ant's insurance policy limits would be considered bad faith and would expose him to
judgment in excess of his policy limits); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal
Op. 303 (unpublished), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS 45 (1967) (deciding that a creditor's lawyer could not tell an unrep-
resented debtor that a judgment against him would injure his credit or reflect on his
moral standing); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1034 (1968) (stat-
ing that a plaintiff's lawyer could not advise an unrepresented defendant that if his
insurance company refused to settle the case when the amount sued for exceeded the
amount of the defendant's coverage, a conflict of interest would exist between the de-
fendant and his insurance company).
9' N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 358 (1974), reprinted in
46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 625 (1974).
- Id.
97 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 303 (unpublished) reprinted in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 45 (1967).
% Id
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In Informal Opinion 1034,99 the ABA ethics committee
considered a letter sent by a plaintiffs attorney to an insured
potential defendant prior to the institution of suit. The letter
informed the potential defendant, who was unrepresented by
counsel, that suit would be filed and offered to settle with him
for the lesser of his insurance coverage or an amount stated in
the letter."° The letter warned the insured that if the amount
of his coverage were less than the amount sued for and the
insurance company subsequently refused to accept the offer,
a conflict of interest would then exist between the defendant
and his insurance company.' 0' The committee concluded
that this letter violated the disciplinary rule because it at-
tempted to advise an unrepresented defendant as to the
law. 102
In Formal Opinion 58,103 the ABA ethics committee con-
cluded that it would be unethical for a lawyer, consulted by a
client who wished to procure a divorce, to confer with the
unrepresented spouse in an attempt to persuade her to agree
to a divorce. 10 4 Reasoning that such a situation might lead
the attorney to give advice to the spouse, 105 the committee
concluded that the attorney should limit his communication
to a statement of the proposed action and a recommendation
- ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1034 (1968).
100 Id.
,o, The letter stated:
You undoubtedly bought insurance not only for your own financial
protection, but also for the humane purpose of adequately compensating
those to whom you might become legally liable for injuries sustained.
The law does not permit - to sue your liability insurer directly, but
upon a final judgment against you awarding money damages to -
your insurer is then compelled to pay the award up to the amount of
your insurance coverage. We have no way of finding out the amount of
your insurance coverage. However, if the award exceeds the limits of
your coverage, then under the law, you are personally liable for the ex-
cess out of your own pocket. - does not want this to happen to you.
It is the object of this letter to set your mind at ease and assure you that
it need not happen.
102 Id
," ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 58 (1931).
105 Id
that the spouse seek independent counsel. 116
In Informal Opinion 1140,107 the ABA ethics committee
considered whether it would be improper for the attorney
representing the plaintiff in a domestic relations case to ob-
tain a waiver of certain rights from the defendant who was
unrepresented by counsel.'0 8 The waiver form in question
waived the issuance of and service of summons, the right to
contest the jurisdiction or venue of the court, and notice to
take depositions.'0 9 The committee quoted from its Formal
Opinion 58 "' in which it decided that in a similar situation
"[t]he proper procedure [was] to limit the communication as
nearly as possible to a statement of the proposed action, and
a recommendation that the adverse party should consult in-
dependent counsel.""' The committee concluded that if such
a waiver were obtained from an unrepresented defendant it
would be a violation of proper ethical conduct." 2
The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances reaffirmed this position in Informal Opinion 125513 in
1972. There, it was called upon to decide whether it would
be improper for an attorney to send a copy of a form of "Ap-
pearance and Responsive Pleading of Respondent" pre-
scribed by a state supreme court to an unrepresented
defendant in a "no fault" divorce action." 4 The committee
decided that under these circumstances the attorney would
be improperly advising both parties within DR7-
,o6 Id.
,07 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1140 (1970).
I Id.
' Id The waiver form further provided that the case be submitted to the court
during its term or in vacation and without further notice to the defendant. The form
also provided that depositions could be taken at any time, without notice, and without
formality. Id
,1o ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 58 (1931).
- Id
"1 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1140 (1970).
"1 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1255 (1972).11 Id
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104(A)(2)'s" 5 prohibition against representing both parties
when there was a reasonable possibility of conflict of
interests. 16
IV. IS THE LETTER ETHICAL?
It is clear that an attorney, during the course of representa-
tion of his client, may communicate to a limited extent with a
potentially adverse party who is unrepresented by counsel." 7
Thus, an underwriter, who is also an attorney, does not vio-
late the Code by the mere act of mailing a letter to a victim
or the family of a victim of an aircrash. Nor does he violate
the Code by advising the victim to secure counsel."' As previ-
ously discussed, an attorney does not violate the Code by
communicating with an unrepresented adverse party if he
avoids everything that may tend to mislead the party, and he
does not undertake to advise him as to the law." 9 The ques-
tion, then, is whether an underwriter tends to mislead an un-
represented potentially adverse party or undertakes to advise
him as to the law when he sends the party a letter explaining
the rationale for contingency fees, saying that no contingency
exists in the case and stating that there is nothing to be
gained by a precipitous lawsuit.'20 The Alpert Letter states:
You may find yourself under pressure to sign a contingent fee
retainer with an attorney whereby his fee is the percentage of
the final award. The rationale for such a percentage fee is
that the lawyer risks getting no fee if there is no recovery.
There is no such contingency in this case. There is nothing to
be gained by a precipitous lawsuit. We do suggest that it
would be in your best interest to evaluate the offers which will
,5 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1979).
11 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1255 (1972).
- ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 908 (1966); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 670 (1963); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, For-
mal Op. 102 (1933). See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to
which an attorney ethically may communicate with an unrepresented adverse party).
1a MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-104(A)(2) (1979).
,,9 M. PIRSIG, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 285 (1970). See supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
- Alpert Letter, supra note 24.
1983] COMMENTS 231
be made to you and obtain the help of your attorney based
upon a fee for the work involved rather than a percentage of
the settlement award.
1 21
The statement, "[t]here is no such contingency in this
case," may mislead the letter's recipient if he construed it to
mean that "there is no contingency as to the amount of recov-
ery.' 1 22 The amount of recovery in a given case depends
upon many variables including the nature and extent of the
loss suffered, conflicts of laws questions, the availability of
prejudgment interest, and the applicability of international
conventions.123 A claimant could be misled to his detriment if
he decided to forego retaining counsel in the mistaken belief
that there was no possibility of increasing the amount of his
recovery. While the possibility of this interpretation and re-
sult probably was not anticipated or intended by the in-
surer, 124 the Code prohibition against misleading an adverse
party is objective and may be violated when a lawyer makes
a statement which merely "tends to mislead" an adverse
,2, Id. The letter continues:
Immediate legal action is unnecessary to avoid permitting applicable
time periods (i.e., statutes of limitations, etc.) to expire. Should discus-
sion not ultimately result in an amicable resolution of any claims that
might exist, we provide a reasonable extension of any applicable time
limitation based upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case
in order that you will have ample time to take any path you choose as to
counsel you retain, the basis upon which he is paid or whether you wish
to institute a lawsuit. Please do not be rushed into limiting your alterna-
tives or committing yourselves needlessly to an inordinate legal expense.
Id
I22 Lee Kreindler apparently adheres to this construction of the statement. Kreindler
argues that the statement gives erroneous legal advice because claims may exist for
punitive damages in air crash cases. Kreindler, Chicago Post-Mortem--Shamefil Behavior,
N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1979, at p.1, col. 1.
2 See supra, notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
,21 See Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 6. Craft implies that the
insurer's intent in making this statement is to "draw attention to the fact that recovery
is not contingent in that [upon] receipt of necessary damage information a settlement
offer will be promptly made." Id. Robert L. Alpert, Jr. suggested that the statement
was intended to inform claimants that "recovery [was] guaranteed" because the insurer
was prepared to pay compensatory damages on behalf of the airlines regardless of who
was found ultimately to be liable for the accident. Telephone interview with Robert
L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Director of Claims for USAU (Oct. 6, 1983).
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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party who is unrepresented by counsel.1
25
Even if the reader understands the statement to convey its
intended meaning, that recovery itself is not contingent, the
statement may be misleading when it is made before the air-
line has stipulated liability for compensatory damages. When
the letter was mailed after the Chicago DC-10 crash in 1979,
American Airlines, the underwriter's insured, had not admit-
ted its liability for compensatory damages.126 Since liability
was still in issue, the letter's statement that there was no con-
tingency as to recovery was erroneous.
127
The next question is whether the letter's statement renders
"advice as to the law" within the Code's prohibition.' 28 As
previously discussed, the Code forbids rendering advice to
an unrepresented adverse party regarding his legal rights or
the legal consequences of his acts or omissions. 129 While the
statement says nothing about the consequences of the readers'
acts or omissions, it may be argued that it informs them of
their legal right to compensation. On the other hand, it may
also be argued that the statement is a promise to pay.
30  If
that is the intended meaning and the meaning conveyed to
the reader, the statement does not violate the Code.
12, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 734 (1964); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Formal Op. (1938). See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
- Kreindler, Chicago Post-Mortem--Shameful Behavior, N.Y.L.J. June 15, 1979 at p. 1,
col. 1.
121 See Kreindler, supra note 3, at 10, in which Lee Kreindler opines that the state-
ment is erroneous legal advice. In the litigation arising out of the crash of the American
Airlines DC-10 in Chicago in 1979, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the letter's statement that there was no contingency constituted an admis-
sion of liability. USAU argued, and the court agreed, that the letter itself did not
remove the issue of liability but was merely an offer to settle. USAU argued that when
the letter was mailed a few days after the aircrash neither the insurer nor the parties
had conducted enough discovery to determine which party was liable. The insurer, in
offering to pay compensatory damages on behalf of the airline, retained the right to
litigate the issue of liability with the other defendants. Telephone interview with Rob-
ert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Director of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6,
1983). See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
12. M. PIRSIG, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 285 (1970). See supra, note 75 and
accompanying text.
- See supra, notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
- According to Robert L. Alpert, Jr., the statement is an offer to settle. Telephone
interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Director of Claims of
USAU (Oct. 6, 1983).
COMMENTS
The letter next informs the reader that the "rationale" un-
derlying the contingency fee is that the lawyer risks getting
no fee if there is no recovery.' 3 ' This statement has been criti-
cized for failing to mention that contingency fees provide a
means of hiring competent legal talent in circumstances
where plaintiffs may be unable to afford hourly fees.' 32 Re-
gardless of whether it is the best explanation of the rationale
underlying the contingency fee, the letter's definition does not
violate the Code's prohibition against misleading unrepre-
sented adverse parties because it does not induce or tend to
induce the party to take a position adverse to his own best
interests. 133 Similarly, the definition does not render advice
as to the legal rights of the reader or the legal consequences of
his acts or omissions. 134 Thus, it does not violate the Code's
prohibition against rendering advice "as to the law."
More significant arguments may be raised against the let-
ter's statement, "There is nothing to be gained by a precipi-
tous lawsuit."'' 35 First, many jurisdictions allow prejudgment
interest.136 Thus, in those jurisdictions, the earlier a claimant
files suit, the larger the interest component of his final recov-
ery will be. Second, a plaintiff may be benefitted by filing
suit quickly in a jurisdiction that has favorable choice of law
rules or standards of damages 37 because most actions arising
out of an aircrash that are filed in federal district courts are
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
and transferred to a single district for discovery and other
, Alpert Letter, supra note 24.
,12 Kreindler, Chicago Post-Mortem---Shameul Behavior, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1979, at p.1,
col. 1.
" See supra, notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
,:11 See generally, Kreindler, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing several reasons why claim-
ants should file their lawsuits quickly).
- Louisiana, for example, provides that twelve percent interest will be added on
compensatory damages awarded in a suit, calculated from the day suit was filed. Krei-
ndler, supra note 3, at 10. See also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d
633, 637-41 ( 7th Cir. 1981) (discussing the availability of prejudgment interest under
Illinois law).
131 In choosing where to file their lawsuits, plaintiffs are likely to consider whether
prejudgment interest is recoverable in a particular jurisdiction and whether punitive
damages are recoverable in wrongful death suits. See supra, note 19.
19831
234 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
pre-trial proceedings.'38 The Panel, in making its determina-
tion regarding the venue for multidistrict litigation, may
take into consideration the number of cases that are filed in a
particular district. 139 Thus, by filing his lawsuit before the
Panel makes this -determination, a plaintiff increases the
chances that his lawsuit may be maintained in his preferred
jurisdiction. 4 °
The letter fails to mention the advantages that a claimant
may forego by heeding its advice to not file a precipitous law-
suit. 14 1 In fact, Robert L. Alpert, Jr. questions whether these
alleged "advantages" exist. 142 Alpert asserts that USAU in-
cludes prejudgment interest in its settlement offers in jurisdic-
tions that provide for it. 143 Alpert further points out that
cases subject to multidistrict litigation are consolidated only
for liability and discovery issues. 144 Most of the cases are re-
moved to the jurisdiction in which they were originally filed
for the trial of damage issues.'45 Thus, in aircrash cases
where liability is stipulated and the amount of damages is the
only issue, the claimant's trial will take place in the jurisdic-
tion filed, regardless of where the multidistrict litigation took
place. "'
But for the letter, the underwriter is certainly not under a
duty to inform a claimant of the potential advantages, if any,
of filing suit quickly. In fact, such information would be con-
sidered a violation of the Code's prohibition against render-
ing "advice as to the law" to an unrepresented adverse
" Such consolidation is done pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
Kreindler, Chicago Post-Mortem--Shame&/ Behavior, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1979, at 1,
col. 1.
- Id Kreindler writes that in litigation arising out of the 1979 American Airlines
DC-10 crash in Chicago, there was a "mad rush" by defendants to move all of the cases
to Chicago. According to Kreindler, the defendants feared the choice of law rules in
California which were very favorable to plaintiffs. Id
,4, Alpert Letter supra note 24.
,42 Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-





party. " ' By making the statement at all, the underwriter
places itself in a precarious position in which the ethics of its
statement may depend finally upon the reader's understand-
ing of the word "precipitous."'' 48 One may agree that there is
nothing to be gained by a "precipitous" lawsuit if one under-
stands the term to mean "rash" or "marked with unwise
haste."' 49 Yet, there may be advantages to filing suit quickly.
Thus, if the reader, defining "precipitous" as "quick", under-
stands the statement to mean that there is nothing that can
be gained by filing suit quickly, he may be induced not to do
so. If the "advantages" to filing suit quickly exist and the
reader, in reliance upon the letter's advice, decides not to do
so, the letter has misled him to his detriment, in violation of
the Code. 150
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' attorneys, outraged by the Alpert Letter's aggres-
sive approach and, undoubtedly, equally incensed by the dra-
matic effect it has had on the size of their fees,' 5' insist that its
use be stopped. 5 2 Their most convincing argument is that
the letter violates the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that prohibits an attorney from giving advice
to a party, unrepresented by counsel, whose interests are ad-
verse to those of the attorney's client. 53 The question, then,
is whether the ABA, state bar associations, courts, or legisla-
tures should take action to prohibit further use of the letter.
The propriety of the Alpert Letter should be analyzed by
considering not only whether it violates the Code, but also
whether it frustrates the policies underlying the Code. Such
analysis should include an additional consideration - whether
117 Id See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
4 lpert Letter, supra note 24.
10 "Precipitous" means marked by great rapidity, haste, or lack of caution. WEB-
STERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1784 (1964).
See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
Plaintiffs' attorneys' contingency fees have been diminished substantially as a re-
sult of the Tenerife Approach. Kreindler, supra note 3, at 38.
152 Kreindler, supra note 3, at 9; Wermeil, supra note 1.
... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2)(1979).
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there are other factors involved in the aftermath of a major
disaster which trigger other policy considerations outweigh-
ing those underlying the disciplinary rule.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains
only one explanation of the policy underlying the disciplinary
rule. "'54 EC7-18, 55 which accompanies the rule, states, "The
legal system functions. . . best when persons in need of legal
advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel.'
'1 56
ABA ethics committee opinions indicate that the purpose of
the disciplinary rule is to preserve the proper functioning of
the attorney-client relationship and to shield an unrepre-
sented party from improper approaches.1
57
Part of the rationale underlying the rule undoubtedly is
based on the imbalance in legal knowledge and skill between
a lawyer and a layman.5 8 A layman ordinarily does not have
the requisite knowledge of the law to be able to evaluate skill-
fully his position and options.'59 Additionally, a layman un-
wittingly may reveal matters during a discussion with
opposing counsel that he legitimately might choose not to re-
veal upon proper advice from his own counsel.' 6° Because of
Id. EC 7-18 (1979).
Id.
Id The ABA's recently adopted MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
forbid a lawyer, in dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, from stating or implying that he is disinterested. MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 4.3 (1983), reprintedin 52 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 16,1983). See supra,
note 70 and accompanying text. The comment to rule 4.3 explains, "An unrepresented
person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume
that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even
when the lawyer represents a client." Id
- ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1140 (1970).
I- Kurlantzik, The Prohtibiion on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B.J.
136 (1977). Although Kurlantzik's article primarily addresses itself to the ban on com-
munication between a lawyer and an adverse party who is represented by counsel, it is
arguable that much of his analysis applies equally to the ban on communication be-
tween a lawyer and an unrepresented party. Id.
I- See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 95 (1933)
(noting that even intelligent and educated laymen know little of legal procedure).
- Kurlantzik, supra note 158, at 145. Kurlantzik observed that in communicating
directly with opposing counsel, an unrepresented person might reveal matters that
otherwise would be protected from disclosure by the marital privilege, the privilege
against self-incrimination or some other privilege. Id.
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the inherent unfair advantage a lawyer has with respect to an
unrepresented layman, the ABA has set forth the prohibition
on communication to protect laymen's rights' 6 ' and to pre-
serve the integrity of the legal system.'
62
The Alpert Letter contains at least three statements that
arguably violate the Code either by tending to mislead an
unrepresented adverse party or by giving the party "advice as
to the law". The statements include an explanation of the
rationale underlying the contingency fee, 163 advice that there
is no contingency in the particular case involved, 164 and ad-
vice that there is nothing the reader can gain from a "precipi-
tous" lawsuit. 65  Whether the letter's explanation of the
rationale underlying the contingency fee is incomplete or in-
accurate, 6 6 the explanation does not constitute prohibited
communication because it does not mislead or tend to mis-
lead the reader or give him "advice as to the law". 167
The letter's statement, "[t]here is no such contingency in
this case", is misleading if it is taken to mean that there is
nothing contingent whatever in the lawsuit 68  because in
wrongful death cases arising out of a major aircrash, there are
many variables which may affect the amount of the claim-
ant's recovery.' 6 1 It should be apparent to the reader, how-
1' One source indicates that another rationale underlying the disciplinary rule is the
prevention of client solicitation. 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 47 (1980). CJ.S. states:
A disciplinary rule relating to giving unsolicited advice to laymen by an
attorney does not prohibit communicating information to lay persons
concerning their legal rights or recommending to them that they obtain
counsel, but merely prohibits an attorney from using information as a
bait with which to obtain an agreement to represent them for a fee.
Id
I2 Kurlantzik, supra note 158, at 144. Kurlantzik reasons that the rule is justified by
the ABA's desire to avoid not only improper behavior, but also the appearance of
impropriety. According to Kurlantzik, even the appearance of impropriety among
lawyers fosters public mistrust of the legal system. Id.
Alpert Letter, supra note 24.
mId
SId
For a discussion of the possible inaccuracies of the letter's explanation of the ra-
tionale underlying contingency fees, see supra, notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
See supra, notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
For a discussion regarding this interpretation of the passage, see supra, notes 122-
128 and accompanying text.
1-9 The amount of recovery may depend on conflicts of laws questions, whether pre-
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ever, that the words "no such contingency" refer to the
contingency, assumed in other personal injury cases, that
there will be no recovery. To eliminate the possibility that the
letter's recipients would construe it to mean that there are no
contingencies in the law suit, the letter's drafters should clar-
ify the language of the sentence to leave no doubt about
what is or is not contingent in the case.
The letter's statement, "[t]here is nothing to be gained by a
precipitous lawsuit", 7 ° may not withstand the scrutiny of a
conscientious bar ethics committee. There may be much to
be gained by filing a lawsuit quickly in a jurisdiction advan-
tageous to the plaintiff.' If there are advantages to filing suit
quickly, the letter's statement that there is nothing to be
gained is misleading under the Code's standard 7 2 because it
attempts to persuade the potential claimant to delay filing
suit, which may be against the claimant's best interests.
The statement implictly, at least, advises the reader "as to
the law." The underwriter and, more importantly, the un-
derwriter's attorney are aware of the legal rights of the victim
of an aircrash or his survivors. The purpose of the letter ap-
pears to be to inform the reader of aspects of the aftermath of
an aircrash of which he may be unaware. In its paternalistic
tone, the letter implies that the underwriter is experienced in
these matters. By telling the reader that there is nothing to
be gained by a precipitous lawsuit, the letter implies that, be-
cause of the underwriter's experience with such legal matters,
it knows that there is nothing to be gained.
The drafters of the Alpert Letter should edit and revise it
before they use it again. Certainly USAU is justified in writ-
ing victims or their families to express its condolences and
inform them of its plans to compensate them for the loss they
judgment interest and punitive damages are recoverable, and whether any interna-
tional conventions apply. See supra, notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
o l4pert Letter, supra note 24.
By filing suit quickly in his preferred jurisdiction, a plaintiff may net a larger
recovery because prejudgement interest is allowed, and his claim may be subject to
favorable choice of law rules and standards of damages. For a discussion of the alleged
advantages to filing suit quickly, see supra, notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
" See supra, note 86 and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
have suffered. 73 It does not have the right, however, to use
the letter to advise them about legal issues. Obviously, one of
USAU's main objectives in sending the letter is to persuade
potential claimants to resist plaintiffs attorneys' pressures to
retain them on a contingency fee. 74 This objective may be
achieved without violating the Code by informing potential
claimants of USAU's intentions regarding settlement rather
than making conclusory statements that constitute or ap-
proach impermissible "advice as to the law."
According to Robert L. Alpert, Jr., USAU's intention in
making the statement, "[t]here is no such contingency in this
case", is to inform potential claimants that USAU is pre-
pared to compensate them for their loss on behalf of the in-
sured airline, regardless of whether or not the airline
ultimately is found liable for the accident.' 75 Alpert says that
USAU is justified in making the statement, "[t]here is noth-
ing to be gained by a precipitous lawsuit," because USAU
intends to include prejudgment interest in its calculations of
settlement offers in jurisdictions where it is allowed.' 76
USAU should inform potential claimants of these intentions
and allow them to draw their own conclusions about whether
hiring a lawyer on a contingency fee is warranted under the
circumstances. This portion of the letter might read as
follows:
.73 As previously mentioned, the Code does not establish an absolute ban on com-
munication between an attorney and a potentially adverse party who is unrepresented
by counsel. See supra, note 73, and accompanying text.
- Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983). Alpert suggested that the Tenerife Approach
was formulated in an effort to combat the extremely large legal fees associated with
aircrash litigation. See supra, notes 6-I1, infra, note 183 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the rationale underlying the introduction of the Tenerife Approach.
"If Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983).
,- Id. Alpert further discredits the argument that because of multi-district litigation
plaintiffs are benefitted when they file suit quickly because they thereby increase the
possibility that the multi-district litigation will take place in their preferred jurisdic-
tion. According to Alpert, the situs of the multi-district litigation is irrelevant because
the cases are sent back to the jurisdiction in which they were originally filed for trial on
the issue of damages. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 142-147 and accom-
panying text.
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The management at United States Aviation Underwriters,
Inc. and the management of the airline have determined that
it is our duty to compensate you for the loss you have suffered
with as little delay as possible. Instead of delaying payment
to you until after it has been determined which of the poten-
tial defendants in the case (the airline, the manufacturer or
the government, for example) ultimately is liable for the acci-
dent, we will pay you money damages to compensate you for
your loss as quickly as possible. You may consider this letter a
promise by USAU that your recovery in the case is guaran-
teed. The amount we will offer you will be reasonable, it will
include prejudgment interest in jurisdictions where it is al-
lowed, and it will not depend upon your filing suit or hiring a
lawyer. You may find yourself under pressure to sign a con-
tingency fee retainer with an attorney whereby his fee is a
percentage of the final award. In deciding whether or not to
retain an attorney on this type of arrangement, please remem-
ber our promise that your recovery in this case is guaranteed.
The letter then should advise the claimant to obtain the help
of an attorney retained on something other than a contin-
gency fee to evaluate USAU's settlement offers.
By couching these remarks in terms of promises, the letter
would not violate the Code and it would notify the reader
that large contingent fees may not be warranted in light of
the insurer's promise to pay. Assuming that USAU's pro-
fessed intentions are sincere, the letter's language would not
induce or tend to induce an unrepresented adverse party to
take a position adverse to his own best interests.' 77 Nor would
it render advice as to the legal rights of the reader or the legal
consequences of his acts or omissions. 78 Though the pro-
posed passage would inform the reader that it is not necessary
to file suit or retain an attorney in order to recover damages,
the passage would not render advice as to the legal conse-
quences of not filing suit. Instead, it would promise that no
ill consequences would befall him by not filing suit.
1" For discussion of the Code's prohibition against misleading an unrepresented ad-
verse party, see supra, notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
" For a discussion of the Code's prohibition against rendering "advice as to the
law" to an unrepresented adverse party, see supra, notes 93-116 and accompanying
text.
COMMENTS
While the language of the Alpert Letter is in need of some
revising, there are a number of reasons why the letter itself
should not be banned. First, the Alpert Letter is not inconsis-
tent with the policies underlying the Code's prohibition on
communication.179 The letter encourages claimants to retain
their own counsel to advise them throughout the settlement
process, 8 ° and once such counsel has been retained, USAU
directs all further communication to him.'8 ' Moreover, the
letter's purpose clearly is not to gain an unfair advantage
over claimants by using the underwriter's superior knowledge
and legal expertise.' 2 Rather, the letter's main purpose ap-
pears to be to combat the exorbitant cost to the insurer result-
ing from plaintiffs' attorneys' contingency fees.' 83 To fully
understand why, as a matter of policy, bar associations
should not prohibit the use of an edited version of the Alpert
Letter, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under
which the letter is sent.
After a major aircrash, the victims or their families are
caught in the midst of a chaotic situation in which plaintiffs'
attorneys vie for the chance to represent them in litigation,
and the airline and its underwriters attempt to convince them
that there is no need to file suit. '84 With hundreds of millions
of dollars on the line, many plaintiff and defense attorneys
and underwriters overlook the family's grief. In the midst of
all this confusion, victims' families receive the Alpert Letter.
- See supra, notes 156-163 and accompanying text (discussing the various policies
underlying the disciplinary rule).
"l pert Letter, supra note 24.
"' Craft, supra note 2, at 901.
John Brennan, president of U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. stated that the pur-
pose of the Alpert Letter was:
. . . to address some of the practices of certain members of the plaintiff's
bar, where the contingent fee was exorbitant . . . . This isn't an at-
tempt at all by the insurance community to come up with a reduced
settlement. We got into this with the idea that families should receive
damages earlier and not have to give away a large portion of it in attor-
neys fees.
Wermeil, supra note 1. For a discussion of purposes underlying the genesis of the Al-
pert Letter, see supra, notes 6-11, 176 and accompanying text.
See supra, notes 6-11, 176, and accompanying text.
'" See generally, The Letter- ShouldIt Be Sent?, THE BRIEF 5 (Nov. 1982) (discussing the
pros and cons of the Tenerife Approach).
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Undoubtedly the underwriter's motivating purpose in
sending the letter is a selfish one, to reduce claims costs.18 5
Yet, the letter has done more than help the underwriter. It
has benefited the public by forcing plaintiffs' attorneys to re-
duce drastically the size of their contingency fees in aircrash
cases. 186
Contingency fees of a large percentage of the final judg-
ment are abusive in litigation arising out of a major airline
crash for two reasons: (i) the plaintiffs' attorneys assume no
significant contingency in these cases, 87 and (ii) the fees are
excessive in relation to the value of work performed in
presenting the claims."I At least part of the justification of
the contingency fee in other contexts is that the lawyer as-
sumes the risk of receiving no compensation if no damages
are awarded or no settlement is made." 9 In litigation arising
out of a major airline crash, however, the contingency disap-
pears when the airline stipulates its liability or when it
promises potential claimants that recovery is guaranteed.
For these reasons, ordinary contingency fee arrangements
are unconscionable in aircrash cases.' 9° Because the Alpert
In', Contingency fees increase the underwriter's costs because claimants, who have
hired a lawyer to represent them on a contingency fee, may be unwilling to accept
settlement offers for amounts that otherwise would have been satisfactory if they were
not obliged to pay a large percentage of the settlement as a contingency fee. Craft, The
Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 6. Lawyers working on a contingency fee basis
may cause further expense to the underwriter by purposefully dragging out the litiga-
tion of a claim in order to justify the amount of their fees. Craft, supra note 2, at 918.
- In his article, The Letter Should Not Be Sent, Lee Kreindler contends that contin-
gency fees have dropped to an average of 17.5 percent in major airline cases from the
average of 33.33 percent that prevails in most negligence cases. Kreindler, supra note 3,
at 38. Randal Craft confirms that contingency fees charged in major aircrash cases
now range from 15 to 25 percent. Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 8.
18, Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 8.
I'm Telephone interview with Robert L. Alpert, Jr., Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Claims of USAU (Oct. 6, 1983). Alpert said that in litigation arising out of the
1979 American Airlines DC-10 crash in Chicago, it was reported that at least one
plaintiffs' attorney had charged such a high percentage fee in relation to the amount of
work done on the case that his time, if billed by the hour, would have been charged at
approximately $10,000 per hour. Id.
I" Id See supra, notes 132-135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ration-
ale underlying the contingency fee.
- Craft, The Letter Should Be Sent, supra note 19, at 8. Craft suggests that contingent
fees should apply only to the amount above the total of the underwriter's original offer
plus interest that the money offered would have earned if it had been invested during
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Letter has brought about significant reduction in the amount
of plaintiffs' attorneys' contingency fees, bar associations
should not prohibit the letter's continued use. Instead, they
should recommend that it be modified to exclude or delete
those passages which are suspect under the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
the period commencing with the making of the offer and ending at the time of the
ultimate verdict or settlement. Id.

